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Tracing Theory on the Body of the 
“Walking Dead”: Der Muselmann and 
the Course of Holocaust Studies
Lissa Skitolsky 
Susquehanna University
The history of philosophical positions about the meaning of Holocaust victim 
experience can be organized around three general stances identified by the moral 
implications that follow: the “redemptive,” “nihilistic,” and “narcissistic” positions. 
Further, each stance includes a distinct view of the muselmann—that category 
of Holocaust victim generally referred to as the “walking dead”—that serves to 
confirm its larger theoretical claims. These categories have served as a helpful 
pedagogical tool when teaching a wide variety of texts in the field of Holocaust 
studies, and students can identify the limitations of each position in terms of 
the caricature of the muselmann on which it rests. Lastly, organizing a syllabus 
around these three positions encourages a certain intellectual progression from 
moral judgment, to moral uncertainty, to renewed engagement with the world.
All the musselmans who finished in the gas chambers have the 
same story, or more exactly, have no story; they followed the 
slope down to the bottom, like streams that run down to the 
sea. On their entry into the camp, through basic incapacity, or 
by misfortune, or through some banal incident, they are over-
come before they can adapt themselves . . . and nothing can save 
them from selections or from death by exhaustion. Their life is 
short, but their number is endless; they, the Muselmänner, the 
drowned, form the backbone of the camp, an anonymous mass, 
continually renewed and always identical, of non-men who 
march and labour in silence . . . already too empty to really suffer. 
One hesitates to call them living: one hesitates to call their death 
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death, in the face of which they have no fear, as they are too tired 
to understand. 
       Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz1
Philosophical contributions to the field of Holocaust Studies have primar-
ily involved an interrogation of the meaning of Nazism and the experience 
of its victims by scholars in a variety of fields. The history of the different 
approaches reveals three distinct positions about the meaning of meaning; or 
the possibility and significance of drawing lessons from an historical event of 
exceptional violence and brutality.2 Corresponding to each position is a par-
ticular view of the muselmann, that category of prisoner commonly referred 
to as the “walking dead,” which serves to confirm the legitimacy of the larger 
theoretical claim. 
In my experience the pedagogical model of three distinct philosophical 
positions in Holocaust scholarship has provided students with an organi-
zational method for studying the vast number of works and perspectives in 
the field. It is possible to identify each position in terms of certain moral im-
plications that can be drawn from its respective portrayal of the muselmann; 
thus, one position leads us to a logic of redemption, another to nihilism, and 
a third to narcissism.3 I do not mean to suggest that every text that falls into 
one of these three positions necessarily intends or implies one of these moral 
stances. Rather, they emerge as distinct possibilities from three different con-
ceptions of the muselmann which inform three different views on how we can 
proceed with ethics in the wake of the Holocaust. If these moral stances are 
found wanting or excessive, then they also inspire students to be critical about 
the texts they read and to identify problems with the various caricatures of 
the muselmann that give rise to these positions. And this exercise in critical 
thought can also lead students to develop their own insights about Holocaust 
victim experience and so become more personally invested in the question of 
1Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz, trans. Stuart Woolf (New York: Touchstone, 
1996), p. 90.
2I do not mean to suggest that every philosophical response to Nazism can be identi-
fied with one of these three positions, which serve to characterize general trends within 
scholarship rather than the entirety of arguments about the meaning of Auschwitz.
3I have also made use of these categories to describe trends in Holocaust scholarship 
in a separate essay entitled “Finding Man in the Muselmann,” which appears in the book 
Metacide: In the Pursuit of Excellence (New York: Rodopi Editions, 2010). 
76 ♦ Lissa Skitolsky    
Shofar  ♦  An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies
how we can assign meaning to an experience marked by the loss of meaning, or 
the loss of those values and ideals that infuse our lives with purpose and sense. 
Approaching the field of Holocaust studies through the lens of three 
distinct theoretical stances may also help students recognize some common 
philosophical commitments in otherwise widely divergent texts. Further, 
I have found that organizing a syllabus around texts that take my students 
through each of the three dominant positions on the meaning of Nazism and 
the muselmann encourages a certain intellectual progression from judgment, to 
moral uncertainty, to renewed engagement with the world. 
The term muselmann was a part of the camp slang at multiple Nazi camps 
and was used to refer to those prisoners who could no longer work or struggle 
to live, who appeared vacant and comatose while still alive though minimally 
aware of their surroundings. However, there are discrepancies in victim tes-
timonies about where the term arose, the nature of the condition to which it 
refers, why it occurred, and how prevalent it was in the camp population as 
a whole. Though generally recognized as a medical condition resulting from 
severe malnutrition, the term muselmann also denotes a state of despair that is 
co-existent with the total withdrawal from the environment, from any possi-
ble relation to the other. As Wolfgang Sofsky explains, “It is debatable whether 
the Muselmann can be properly grasped using established nosological catego-
ries. Although hunger is the basis for numerous diseases, misery is not an ill-
ness. Nor is the extinction of the field of consciousness, nor social isolation, 
nor persecution. . . . It is an object not for psychology, but rather for a social 
anthropology of misery.”4 The figure of the muselmann looms large in victim 
testimony and yet evades the light of both theory and science. Perhaps for this 
reason the muselmann is that case upon which each theory about the meaning 
of Auschwitz stands and ultimately falls. 
Three Philosophical Approaches Toward the Holocaust
In the previous section I claimed that it is possible to identify three distinct 
philosophical positions about the meaning of Holocaust victim experience in 
terms of their respective conceptions of the muselmann and the moral impli-
cations that follow. I identified these positions in terms of the moral stances 
that may follow from them: the “redemptive,” “nihilistic,” and “narcissistic” posi-
4Wolfgang Sofsky, The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp, translated by Wil-
liam Templer (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 200.
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tions. It is important to emphasize that these are general categories meant to 
organize a vast amount of scholarship and are in no way meant to exhaust 
the variety of philosophical theories about the meaning of victim testimony. 
However, the originality of any position can be gauged by its contrast to these 
three dominant trends in scholarship. The scholars that I associate with each 
general stance have all made important contributions to the field of Holocaust 
studies, and I will argue that the limitations of their theories may be grasped 
in their respective caricatures of the “walking dead.” 
The defining feature of the “redemptive” approach is the claim that Holo-
caust victim experience offers compelling evidence of the strength of the hu-
man spirit in an extreme situation designed to destroy it. This claim leads to 
three further conclusions: 1) since it was possible for victims to resist their 
spiritual decline, we must affirm the values that allowed them to do so, 2) the 
depravity of Nazism must be recognized as an attack upon these values of 
the Good, the True, and the Just, and 3) we can draw important lessons from 
Holocaust victim testimony that confirm the validity of our moral categories 
and western worldview. 
Scholars who have adapted this stance include Viktor Frankl, Terrence 
Des Pres, and Bruno Bettelheim, all of whom claim that the average camp in-
mate was able to improve his chances of survival through conscious efforts to 
retain hope, faith, and a will to live amidst conditions that seemingly negated 
the value of all three. And for all of them the correlation between these efforts 
and the increased possibility of survival restores the power and importance 
of the human spirit and the moral worldview after their assault in the camps. 
And in order to confirm these claims all three scholars maintain that it was 
possible for a prisoner to resist the decline into the state of the muselmann 
through a determined effort to survive and remain human; those who ceased 
to resist the process of dehumanization that marked the logic of the camp 
soon fell into the condition of the muselmänner. 
As Bettelheim explains in his essay Surviving, “Only active thought could 
prevent a prisoner from becoming one of the walking dead (Muselmänner) 
whom he saw all around him—one of those who were doomed because they 
had given up thought and hope.”5 Even in his book The Informed Heart, where 
he provides a nuanced account of camp life and emphasizes the role that 
chance and luck played in the ability to stay alive, Bettelheim insists that in-
5Bruno Bettelheim, Surviving And Other Essays (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 
p. 293.
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mates declined into muselmänner only when they “gave up” trying to survive, or 
“had given the environment total power over them.”6 For Bettelheim, the effort 
to resist the camp’s influence was the moral imperative that saved men from 
becoming muselmänner: “That is, as long as a prisoner fought in any way for 
survival, for some self assertion within and against the overpowering environ-
ment, he could not become a ‘moslem.’”7 Frankl also insists that “only the men 
who allowed their inner hold on their moral and spiritual selves to subside 
eventually fell victim to the camp’s degenerating influences.”8 For these schol-
ars survival in the Nazi camp was an act of will, the expression of human spirit 
against the force that aimed for its destruction. In this sense the survivors 
redeem our faith in humanity, in the strength of the spirit to overcome evil. 
When students read works by scholars who put forth the redemptive position, 
most feel as if their faith in the power and reality of our ideals is confirmed, 
and so too their capacity to be the judges of good and evil. 
By way of transition to the second position my students read the essay At 
the Mind’s Limits, by the former victim and philosopher Jean Améry, where he 
expresses admiration for those prisoners who were better able to adapt to the 
camp’s environment through their fidelity to political or religious ideals:
Both the Christians and the Marxists, who already on the outside had taken 
a very subjective view of concrete reality, detached themselves from it here too 
in a way that was both impressive and dismaying. Their kingdom, in any event, 
was not the Here and Now, but the Tomorrow and Someplace, the very distant 
Tomorrow of the Christian, glowing in chiliastic light, or the utopian-worldly 
Tomorrow of the Marxists. The grip of the horror reality was weaker where 
from the start reality had been placed in the framework of an unalterable idea. 
Hunger was not hunger as such, but the necessary consequence of atheism or of 
  6Bruno Bettelheim, The Informed Heart: Autonomy in a Mass Age (New York: The 
Free Press, 1960), p. 151.
7Bettelheim, The Informed Heart, p. 152.
8Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, trans. Ilse Lasch (New York: Touchstone, 
1959), p. 78.  For Terrence Des Pres (The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps 
[New York: Oxford University Press, 1976]), the Muselmänner represent those who were 
“murdered in spirit as the means of killing them in body” (p. 88), and each prisoner had a 
choice to retain hope and thus spirit or “quit and join the Muselmänner” (p. 90); “. . . as long 
as the spirit does not break, the survivor keeps mute faith in life . . . just the shock of real-
izing that one was becoming a Muselman was enough to inspire new will” (p. 92).  
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capitalistic decay. A beating or death in the gas chamber was the renewed suffer-
ings of the Lord or a natural political martyrdom.9 
And, he might have added, the muselmann was the forsaken. Améry ad-
mires those who were able to retain their values in the camp, but they do not 
convince him of the truth of those values or the strength of the human spirit. 
Instead they testify to the power of delusion and indifference to the suffering 
of others. In Auschwitz it was possible to affirm the human spirit only by 
excluding the muselmann from the human community; likewise it was pos-
sible to affirm faith only by excluding the muselmann from the world-to-come. 
This exclusion of a certain category of victims from moral consideration leads 
most of my students to reject the otherwise neat and appealing conclusions of 
scholars who advocate the redemptive position. 
Scholars who adopt a somewhat nihilistic position toward the meaning of 
Holocaust victim experience suggest that it does not testify to the strength but 
to the utter destruction of the human spirit and the impotence of our moral 
concepts. Representatives of this position include Jean Améry, Lawrence L. 
Langer and Maurice Blanchot, all of whom suggest that one cannot draw les-
sons from Holocaust testimony as the Holocaust shattered the foundations of 
our moral universe and the relevance of any and all categories through which 
it could be explained or represented. Further, they also suggest that it is prob-
lematic to retain faith in moral concepts after Auschwitz insofar as their futil-
ity—both in Nazi Germany and in the camps—points to their ultimate irrel-
evance. Thus the only appropriate response to the question of the meaning of 
Auschwitz is to affirm its incomprehensibility, our inability to make sense of 
it or derive moral lessons from the ashes of millions who died without reason.
Langer expresses these sentiments in a passage at the end of his ground-
breaking work Holocaust Testimonies:
The Holocaust does little to confirm theories of moral reality but much to ques-
tion the reality of moral theories. We can of course dismiss this historical mo-
ment as a terrible but temporary aberration, during which human nature veered 
off course for a time but then rediscovered its true compass and restored direc-
tion to its moral voyage. But we do this only by ignoring the hundreds of voices 
of former victims, the details of whose memories frustrate such a placid view. 
Their shrunken moral universe, full of ambiguities concerning the basis for per-
sonal conduct, mocks conceptual efforts, from Plato to the present, to determine 
9Jean Améry, At The Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its 
Realities, trans. Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1980), p. 13.
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the relationship between duty and the good life, what it is right to do and what 
it is good to be.10
Throughout this text Langer argues that oral testimony provides a more 
authentic depiction of the radically compromised life that Holocaust victims 
led, a life of “choiceless choice” that undermined the possibility of moral agen-
cy.11 Further, he claims that oral testimony reveals the impossibility of full re-
covery from this life, the memory of which assaults and divides the survivor 
into two distinct “selves.” Thus, Langer suggests that it is cruel and dishonest 
to evaluate the behavior of Holocaust victims through our moral concepts and 
theories. Indeed, we can affirm them in the aftermath of the Holocaust only 
by ignoring the voices of former victims, who are traumatized by the inapt-
ness of those concepts to their own experience. We cannot derive redemptive 
meaning from an experience whose horror is marked by the loss of meaning 
and moral sense. 
Those scholars whom I associate with the nihilistic position tend to ei-
ther overlook the figure of the muselmann or else regard it as evidence that 
there is no possible commonality between those who suffered then and those 
who try to understand it now. Améry actually claims that we must exclude 
the muselmann from our consideration of victims, as he was simply “a stagger-
ing corpse, a bundle of physical functions in its last convulsions.”12 However, 
he also claims that nearly all of the prisoners at Auschwitz suffered from the 
loss of theoretical thought and aesthetic sensibility,13 and so indicates that the 
muselmann—characterized by the complete loss of thought and will—was 
simply the final product of a process that served to transform camp inmates 
into the “walking dead.” At the end of his reflections “on the mind’s limits,” 
he rejects the possibility of drawing any positive lessons about human nature 
from Holocaust victim experience. He explains that 
[w]e did not become wiser in Auschwitz, if by wisdom one understands positive 
knowledge of the world . . . we did not become “deeper,” if that calamitous depth 
is at all a definable intellectual quantity. It goes without saying, I believe, that in 
Auschwitz we did not become better, more human, more humane, and more ma-
ture ethically. You do not observe dehumanized man committing his deeds and 
10Lawrence L. Langer, Holocaust Testimonies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1991), p. 198.
11Langer, Holocaust Testimonies, p. 26.
12Améry, At the Mind’s Limits, p. 9. 
13Améry, At the Mind’s Limits, p. 19.
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misdeeds without having all of your notions of inherent human dignity placed in 
doubt. We emerged from the camp stripped, robbed, emptied out, disoriented—
and it was a long time before we were able even to learn the ordinary language of 
freedom. Still today, incidentally, we speak it with discomfort and without real 
trust in its validity.14 
That in Auschwitz some men lived and died with greater dignity, resolve, 
and hope than others does not prove the power or importance of these virtues, 
for in Auschwitz the real finally refuted the ideal. At the end of his painstak-
ing analysis of oral testimony that illustrates the impossibility of full recovery 
or survival from Auschwitz, Langer reaches the same conclusion and throws 
into doubt the validity of our moral pretensions about freedom, ethics, and 
human dignity. 
Assuming this same stance, the philosopher Maurice Blanchot wrote 
his meditations on Auschwitz and titled them The Writing of the Disaster 
(L’Ecriture du désastre). This collection of fragments does not convey some-
thing about Auschwitz as a disaster, but instead bears witness to the collapse 
of every conceptual structure that might allow us to understand what is meant 
as a “disaster.” He writes in an early fragment:
The disaster, depriving us of that refuge which is the thought of death, dissuad-
ing us from the catastrophic or the tragic, dissolving our interest in will and in 
all internal movement, does not allow us to entertain this question either: what 
have you done to gain knowledge of the disaster?15
And in a later fragment: “There is disaster only because, ceaselessly, it falls 
short of disaster.”16 Despite its fragmentary style, Blanchot’s work does rep-
resent an alternative posture to the Holocaust; refusing the conventions of 
narrative and logic, Blanchot uses language against itself to expose its own 
plasticity, its own non-relation to anything essential, real, or true. Langer cites 
this work in his book Holocaust Testimonies because it testifies to that excess 
that cannot be named, it forswears the attempt to understand that which can-
not be understood. Blanchot’s meditation aims to avoid, as he writes in one 
entirely italicized fragment, “[t]he danger that the disaster acquire meaning in-
stead of body.”17
14Améry, At the Mind’s Limits, pp. 19–20.
15Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: Univer-
sity of Nebraska Press, 1995), p.  3.
16Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, p. 41.
17Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, p. 41.
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There is a sort of ethical injunction behind this position, this refusal to 
explain that which escapes thought, related to the proper recognition of those 
who suffered. For the effort to understand, to search for the meaning of Aus-
chwitz, assimilates useless, meaning-less suffering within a meaningful narra-
tive that allows us to make sense of the Holocaust as a tragic, historical event. 
When we search for historical causes or examine the psychology of Nazis, we 
assume a possible explanation of why and for what reason people were made to 
suffer the unimaginable, unspeakable horror of mechanized mass death. We 
do so only at the cost of “body,” or at the cost of recognizing that the violence 
done to the bodies of victims was senseless, without cause, reason, or mean-
ing. In a sense, we must allow their suffering to disrupt our need for meaning 
in order to pay heed to it. And in this sense the muselmann is the model par 
excellence for victim experience, for it represents a state wholly other than any 
we could imagine, understand, or endow with meaning. 
The filmmaker Claude Lanzmann explained the focus of his ground-
breaking 1985 film Shoah in such sentiments when he wrote: “There is an 
absolute obscenity in the very project of understanding. Not to understand 
was my iron law during all the eleven years of the production of Shoah.”18 
Eschewing narrative for a series of interviews with bystanders, perpetrators, 
and victims of Nazism, Shoah does not aim to explain or represent the Nazi 
assault but to frustrate our ability to make sense of it. The film presents the 
fragmented testimonies of witnesses unable or unwilling to accurately testify, 
and so represents the impossibility of representing the Nazi genocide. 
Indeed, all the scholars that I associate with the nihilist position suggest 
that the meaning of Auschwitz cannot be considered apart from the impos-
sibility of its representation, and that the failure of signification reveals a nega-
tive meaning that throws into doubt the validity of our concepts and ideals. To 
the extent that our categories fail to represent the facts, to the extent that the 
facts overwhelm any possible meaning for our moral worldview, the horror of 
Auschwitz is marked by the collapse of meaning and understanding, the futil-
ity of the intellect against the reality of meaningless death and useless violence. 
Auschwitz remains the unspeakable and the unknown, and we who seek to 
grasp its meaning must confess our ignorance and our impenetrable distance 
from this site of extremity. Indeed, we continually confront the uselessness 
and poverty of all of our categories when confronted with the image of gas 
chambers and crematoria. 
18Quoted in Cathy Caruth, ed., Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 204.
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When my students read works by scholars who espouse these sentiments, 
they often experience a profound sense of moral confusion attended by feel-
ings of helplessness and despair. They ask a series of profound questions that 
do not admit of any answers: If we are not able to adequately represent, and so 
judge, the behavior of victims and perpetrators in Auschwitz, then what is the 
proper moral response to its horror? If (the writer and former victim) Primo 
Levi is right and there existed in Auschwitz a “gray zone” between good and 
evil that now undermines the possibility of full knowledge and the capacity of 
judgment, how do we retain faith in our moral worldview?19 If it is possible 
that our moral categories do not apply to an extreme situation of mechanized 
mass death, how is it still possible to affirm their objectivity and universality? 
Since our categories do not apply to the muselmann, to someone overcome 
with suffering, how do we affirm their truth and general validity? Further, if 
it is not possible to understand or faithfully represent the condition of the 
muselmann, how do we testify to his suffering and prevent such a condition in 
the future? Is it possible to draw any useful lessons from a situation of useless 
and gratuitous violence that cannot be represented through moral categories 
and theoretical concepts? 
Such questions provoke an epistemological crisis in which the very terms 
that we use to understand our moral obligations are thrown into question, and 
it appears as though we have no choice but to affirm our impotence in the face 
of useless violence. Indeed, many students feel as though they are teetering on 
the edge of nihilism, and they even start to resent their newfound knowledge 
of the impossibility of cognitive and moral certainty about an event that seems 
to demand clarity. For we are not engaging in a Socratic dialogue, and I cannot 
reassure them that our inquiry will eventually lead to greater knowledge of the 
good, the true, and the just. Instead, it appears as though any inquiry about the 
good is wholly misplaced in relation to Auschwitz. This discovery threatens 
their personal sense of vocation, for how can they do good works if they can’t 
trust their moral judgment or power of reasoning? How can they attend to 
those whose condition they cannot understand? 
And so, our hearts heavy with resignation, we begin our study of Giorgio 
Agamben’s Remnants of Auschwitz, in which he makes a sharp distinction be-
tween ethical and juridical categories in the first chapter, entitled The Witness. 
He explains:
19Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, trans. Raymond Rosenthal (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1989), p. 36. 
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One of the most common mistakes—which is not only made in discussions of 
the camp—is the tacit confusion of ethical categories and juridical categories. . . . 
Almost all the categories that we use in moral and religious judgments are in 
some way contaminated by law: guilt, responsibility, innocence, judgment, par-
don. . . . This makes it difficult to invoke them without particular caution. As 
jurists well know, law is not directed toward the establishment of justice. . . . 
Law is solely directed toward judgment, independent of truth and justice. This 
is shown beyond doubt by the force of judgment that even an unjust sentence 
carries with it.20
After struggling with the pessimistic conclusions of the nihilistic position, my 
students tend to view Agamben’s insistence on the difference between moral 
and legal categories as nothing short of a revelation. For they realize that our 
moral response to suffering does not depend upon our ability to judge those 
who suffer, and that our moral responsibility does not exhaust itself in iden-
tifying those who are responsible for violent and evil acts. Instead, following 
Agamben, they consider how our preoccupation with guilt, responsibility, and 
judgment has in fact prevented our ability to draw the very lessons from camp 
life that could better serve our moral worldview and our ethical response to 
those in need. For our concern with judging the perpetrators of genocidal vio-
lence allows us to believe that the problem of Auschwitz—the reality of use-
less, administrative violence—can be overcome through legal channels. 
Agamben does not suggest that we dispense with judgment, but rather 
that we recognize that our moral response to useless and gratuitous suffer-
ing is only hampered by our preoccupation with guilt and innocence. As he 
explains: “To assume guilt and responsibility—which can, at times, be neces-
sary—is to leave the territory of ethics and enter that of law. Whoever has 
made this difficult step cannot presume to return through the door he just 
closed behind him.”21 Our ability to bear witness to suffering has little to do 
with our desire to find out who is legally accountable for such suffering, and 
our call to attend to those in need is strengthened when we suspend the desire 
to judge them.
Referring to the two general positions that I have referred to as the re-
demptive and nihilistic stances, Agamben states: “Some want to understand 
too much and too quickly; they have explanations for everything. Others re-
fuse to understand; they offer only cheap mystifications. The only way forward 
20Giorgio Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: 
Zone Books, 1999), p. 20.
21Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 24.
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lies in investigating the space between these two options.”22 Agamben lays the 
ground for a new philosophical approach to the Holocaust, one that does not 
attempt to conceptually comprehend nor deliberately obscure the nature of 
Auschwitz but, rather, to bear witness to the form-of-life which suffered un-
der its assault. For Agamben the muselmann is the term for that form-of-life 
produced by the Nazi camps, though it is also a symbol for every victim of 
state-sponsored violence who is excluded from the polis, forced to lead a life 
that is neither political nor natural. For Agamben the Holocaust is not alto-
gether other or incomprehensible insofar as it represents the dark shadow of 
our ethical worldview; it was not so much a rupture as the unintended but 
perhaps inevitable outcome of our social and political institutions which are 
founded on the ancient distinction between “life” and the “good life.” In his 
work Agamben suggests that the muselmann is the corporeal reification of that 
notion of “bare life” against which we can judge the value of the “good life” re-
served for citizens of the state. 
Agamben’s perspective correlates with what I have called the narcissistic 
position toward Holocaust victim experience, whereby the study of Nazism 
is approached as an exercise in self-knowledge. By identifying this approach 
with a narcissistic stance, I do not mean to throw doubt on the importance of 
the scholarship to which it refers. I mean only to characterize the general ori-
entation of self-reflection that informs a certain philosophical approach to the 
Holocaust based on the question of how this past sheds light on our present. 
Other scholars who adopt such an orientation toward Nazism include 
Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, as well as contemporary scholars 
Zygmunt Bauman, Slavoj Žižek, Alain Badiou, and Adriana Cavarero. For 
these scholars, Nazism reveals the dark undercurrent of the western tradition 
stripped of the pretense of some natural “moral sense.” The ashes of victims are 
the final judgment against the slaughter-bench of modern political history.23 
For Agamben, Nazism testifies to dominant trends in western politics and, 
in addition, the experience of its victims testifies to fundamental traits of the 
modern human condition. 
In his work Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life Agamben traces 
the roots of Nazism to a form of radical biopolitics, an ancient strategy of sov-
ereign power that aims to include the terms of life itself in its sphere of control 
22Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 13.
23In his work On the Philosophy of History, Hegel refers to History as the “slaughter-
bench at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of States, and the virtue of individuals 
have been victimized . . . ” (New York, Dover Publications, 1956), p. 21.
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through excluding certain individuals from civic participation or the good life. 
These individuals are banished to a “state of exception” in which the law is 
indefinitely suspended, such as a prison or a camp. In a radically biopolitical 
state the protection of the good life and national security coincides with the 
production of what Agamben calls “bare life” (nuda vita), or a politicized form 
of depoliticized life that can be killed with impunity. Agamben maintains that 
we have inherited the biopolitical agenda of Nazi Germany, which explains the 
direction of modern democratic governments in which the “care of life” coin-
cides with the “fight against the enemy.”24 Agamben suggests that the political 
distinction between “life” (zoē) and the “good life” (bios) founds the western 
state and, in particular, establishes the intimacy between violence and the law.
In his work Remnants of Auschwitz Agamben extends his comparative 
analysis between Auschwitz and the present to an analysis of how Holocaust 
victim experience and, specifically, the condition of the muselmann reflects as-
pects of our own condition that we deny at the cost of social progress. Fur-
ther, our inability to recognize ourselves in the state of the muselmann is an 
expression of our dependence upon the distinction between the human and 
inhuman that sustains the economy of state-sanctioned violence in the pres-
ent. And the muselmann represents both the necessary product of a robust 
conception of the human and also its negation. For the muselmann represents 
the apparently impossible co-existence between the human and the inhuman, 
life and death that—for Agamben—nevertheless bears similarity to our expe-
rience of shame or the loss of ourselves (our agency, will, and hope) when we 
are overcome by conditions outside of our control.25 
We insist that the muselmann is not human because we cannot recognize 
the human in one so vulnerable, weak, and helpless; this misrecognition allows 
for the assertion of the robust, humanist self otherwise thrown into ques-
tion by the legions of the “walking dead” who, in Primo Levi’s words, were 
“overcome” before they could adapt themselves. In this way our insistence that 
the muselmann is less than fully human—or was effectively de-humanized—
transforms this category of victim into a negative measure against which we 
derive the properly human and affirm the importance of dignity. According to 
Agamben this approach mirrors that of the Nazis, who held their own con-
ceptions of a properly dignified or distinctly human life: 
24Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-
Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 147.
25Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 110.
 Tracing Theory on the Body of the “Walking Dead” ♦ 87
 Vol. 30, No. 2   ♦   2012
Simply to deny the Muselmann’s humanity would be to accept the verdict of the 
SS and to repeat their gesture. The Muselmann has, instead, moved into a zone 
of the human where not only help but also dignity and self-respect have become 
useless. But if there is a zone of the human in which these concepts make no 
sense, then they are not genuine ethical concepts, for no ethics can claim to ex-
clude a part of humanity, no matter how unpleasant or difficult that humanity 
is to see.26
Agamben connects our de-humanization of the muselmann with our de-
humanization of others who are excluded from the moral and political do-
mains as prisoners, enemy combatants, or patients. And our propensity to 
exclude certain people from the human community is connected to our denial 
of our own vulnerability and shame. Agamben suggests that we displace our 
existential shame through our disgust and judgment of others. For when we 
judge others as evil or less than human, we project our shame onto others, 
as if to convince ourselves that it is possible to fully assume our subjectiv-
ity through the de-subjectification of others. In this sense he explains that 
“[w]ho ever experiences disgust has in some way recognized himself in the ob-
ject of his loathing and fears being recognized in turn. The man who experi-
ences disgust recognizes himself in an alterity that cannot be assumed—that 
is, he subjectifies himself in an absolute desubjectification.”27 For this reason 
Agamben claims that after Auschwitz ethics must begin “precisely at the point 
where the Muselmann . . . makes it forever impossible to distinguish between 
man and non-man.”28
Agamben rejects those moral categories that fail to describe the state of 
the muselmann as both false and complicit; they are false because they assume 
the distinction between the human and the inhuman and they are complicit 
because this very distinction perpetuates cycles of administrative violence that 
aim to produce and re-produce the negative inhuman as an image against 
which to judge or confirm our own humanity. For Agamben the muselmann is 
“the guard on the threshold of a new ethics,” an ethics that does not proceed 
through the act of moral judgment.29 Agamben’s phenomenological medita-
tion on the state of the muselmann not only reveals the insufficiency of our 
standard moral categories, but also points the way toward a new ethical pos-
ture better able to bear witness and attend to the suffering self. 
26Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 64.
27Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 107.
28Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 47.
29Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 69. 
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After reading his meditation on the muselmann as the foundation for a 
new ethics based on the position of the witness, my students tend to feel far 
less hopeless about their individual roles in a genocidal world. Their ability 
to assume a sense of vocation, to attend to those in need, is no longer bound 
to their ability to fully understand or judge the condition of others. After we 
let go of our need to draw distinctions between types of human beings, once 
we come to recognize man in the muselmann, we can assume our vocation 
from the position of a witness, rather than that of a savior or judge. This is 
essential, so that our efforts to attend to others remain faithful to their own 
intent, rather than transmuting themselves into misplaced affirmations of our 
own power and freedom. Agamben suggests that this remains a possibility 
when we retain a certain vocabulary to describe our moral duty in terms of 
dignity, respect, and humanity. For these words have meaning only in relation 
to groups of individuals who are thought to lack these very qualities, and so 
require certain moral judgments that divide and isolate us rather than restore 
and recover our community. 
The Muselmann as the Specter of Holocaust Studies
Though I have found that it is helpful to organize the variety of philosophical 
responses to Auschwitz by what I have termed the redemptive, nihilistic, and 
narcissistic positions, this should not suggest that the works of an individual 
scholar cannot overlap, or that the three positions follow a strict historical pro-
gression.30 Rather, these three distinct positions or approaches can be identi-
fied in the works and memoirs about the Third Reich, and each has found 
expression in cultural representations of Nazism since the end of World War 
II. The excesses and flaws of these positions can be grasped through their cari-
catures of the muselmann, representations offered to provide some evidence 
for their theoretical claims about the meaning of Nazism. 
Scholars who adopt the redemptive position tend to argue for the con-
tinuity of our values through attesting to their real power to assist (some) 
victims in the struggle to survive and retain hope: because it was possible to 
30The most apparent example of an author who cannot be identified exclusively with 
a single position is Hannah Arendt, who at times suggests that our moral concepts are still 
relevant and asserts that we have an obligation to judge Nazis as having committing a great 
evil, and at other times suggests that these same concepts are anachronistic in light of the 
modern world and the rise of totalitarianism. Further, she echoes a “narcisstic” sentiment 
through her suggestion that we re-conceive our traditional categories in light of the “banal-
ity of evil” in the modern world.  
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retain values and dignity then, there is a basis for our faith now. In his essay 
on the “gray zone” Levi provides a thorough retort to Frankl’s view that even in 
Auschwitz man could “search for meaning” and so resist his spiritual decline: 
“It is naïve, absurd, and historically false to believe that an infernal system 
such as National Socialism sanctifies its victims: on the contrary, it degrades 
them, it makes them resemble itself.”31 The effort to understand and judge the 
experience of former victims through the lens of our moral categories distorts 
the conditions of life in Auschwitz, where adaptation required disintegration. 
Further, Améry insists that it was only through turning away from the reality 
of the camps that one could retain faith in a transcendent reality that explained 
the horror of the camps or allowed one to better cope with it. In other words, 
after Auschwitz we affirm our moral world only if the muselmann remains for 
us what he was back then; a specter who cannot be seen. 
In his essay entitled An Idiot’s Tale Omer Bartov surveys a group of texts 
about Nazism that all convey a similar mood of cultural pessimism. He in-
cludes Langer’s Holocaust Testimonies in a list that also includes Christopher 
Browning’s Path to Genocide, Alain Finkielkraut’s Remembering in Vain, and 
Pierre Vidal-Naquet’s Assassins of Memory. Bartov claims that they share 
something in common insofar as they all “fill the reader with an almost un-
bearable sense of despair and helplessness regarding not only the past but also 
the present.” These works convey the message that the Holocaust is a tale that 
signifies nothing. “Indeed,” he says, “it is precisely the meaninglessness of the 
event, made all the clearer now with the benefit of hindsight, the utter use-
lessness of it all, the total and complete emptiness in which this hell on earth 
unfolded, that leaves us breathless, bereft of the power of thought and imagi-
nation. And what is especially frightening is the impossibility of learning from 
the Holocaust, of drawing any lessons, of putting its facts to any use.”32 In the 
course of his essay Bartov suggests that although these works represent a tre-
mendous contribution to the historical record and cultural representation of 
Nazism, they leave us at a standstill, unable to say anything or learn anything 
from a real event, which then appears as an idiot’s tale.
To the extent that every testimony reveals the impossible distance be-
tween us and them, and so learning the fate of every victim leaves us in a simi-
lar state of speechless despair, the nihilistic stance ensures that the muselmann 
31Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, p. 40.
32Omer Bartov, “An Idiot’s Tale,” in Murder in our Midst: The Holocaust, Industrial Kill-
ing, and Representation (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 89.
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remains anonymous, as his condition is assimilated to the condition of all for-
mer victims. Further, his story cannot be told, heard, or understood. He, above 
all, represents the idiot of the idiot’s tale, that category of man for whom our 
categories do not apply, and so who appears senseless and dim. 
Agamben accepts that Nazism represents the unsayable, that which ex-
poses the limits of our values and concepts, though he does not accept the 
conclusion that there is nothing more to be said, and that we remain at an 
impassable distance from the events in question. He states that “[l]istening to 
something absent did not prove fruitless work for this author,”33 as “[w]e . . . 
‘are not ashamed of staring into the unsayable’—even at the risk of discover-
ing that what evil knows of itself, we can also easily find in ourselves.”34 And 
so Agamben begins his meditation on the state of the muselmann through 
reminding us that former victims testify to the impossibility of seeing the 
muselmann, and then draws a correlation between what we cannot see in the 
muselmann and what we refuse to see about ourselves; that we are, at every 
moment, subjects subject to de-subjectification. In this way the muselmann 
comes to represent a caricature of ourselves. 
The redemptive stance to Auschwitz gives us false hope, while the nihilis-
tic stance leaves us without any hope at all; the narcissistic stance trades hope 
for shame. In this way the course of Holocaust studies reveals phases of denial, 
dejection, and confession in the effort to grasp what the events back then mean 
about the way we live our lives now. In this way our analysis of Auschwitz has 
also served our own self-analysis, and the muselmann has remained a specter 
who cannot be seen. My hope is that organizing stages of scholarship around 
conceptions of the muselmann not only is helpful for my students but also 
conveys an important aim of Holocaust studies to testify in the absence of 
testimony, to name and record and grieve for millions who died anonymous, 
mechanized deaths. In this sense the muselmann names a state for which we 
have no name and which we cannot afford to forget. 
33Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 13.
34Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 33.
